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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I ask whether the Program of Direct Support for the Countryside 
(PROCAMPO) helped Mexican agricultural producers benefit from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Specifically, I explore the effect of PROCAMPO’s decoupled income 
payments on producers’ ability to switch to cash crop production, and whether these payments 
continue to alleviate credit constraints for poorer producers. Given that World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations are currently stalled in part because of the trade concerns of developing 
nations, exploring the constraints that small producers face and whether decoupled subsidies can 
assist those producers in benefiting from new markets is important.  
Unlike previous studies, which concentrated on specific regions and ejidal lands, I use nation-
wide county-level data, allowing me to see the regional distribution of change across Mexico. I use 
these data to estimate the change in staple crop production as a function of county-level 
characteristics. This analysis led to several interesting observations. First, I find some evidence to 
support the hypothesis that an increase in PROCAMPO payments leads to a decrease in the area 
planted in staples.  Second, the implementation of NAFTA is associated with greater cash crop 
production, and I can see that the creation of new markets is, in general, leading to a reduction in 
land planted in staples. Third, I find that the effect of PROCAMPO is even larger for ejido 
producers, implying that the benefits are not constrained to larger producers. Last, I find evidence 
that areas closest to the United States border have seen a greater movement to cash crop production 
after NAFTA.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Mexican agriculture 
has been debated extensively over the past fifteen years.  While trade advocates note that Mexican 
farmers have dramatically increased the value of their agricultural exports to the United States and 
Canada, anti-globalization activists argue that NAFTA has harmed small-scale and subsistence 
producers in Mexico, forcing them to compete against subsidized imports.  In this thesis, I examine 
which farmers in Mexico have benefited from NAFTA by being able to switch from traditional 
staples to the production of higher-value cash crops. Specifically, I ask whether the decoupled 
income payments under PROCAMPO (the Program of Direct Support for the Countryside) have 
helped producers move to cash crops by alleviating credit constraints. Due to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) regulations, many developing countries have and may continue to move to 
agricultural support systems similar to PROCAMPO. Therefore understanding whether this 
decoupled income payment program can help agricultural producers overcome credit constraints 
and make the transition to cash crops may have important implications for policy creation in 
developing countries worldwide.  
1.1. Motivation 
In 1995, the WTO’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture1 went into effect. As part of 
this agreement, the type of support that each country provided to the agricultural sector was placed 
into one of three “boxes.” Policies that cause high trade distortion, such as commodity specific price 
supports, fall into the “amber box” and are capped, while those that are minimally trade distorting 
belong in the “green box.” Payments that fall into the “green box” category can be unlimited. 
Member countries of the WTO, such as Mexico, were therefore encouraged to reform their 
agricultural policy to allow their method of support to be categorized in the “green box.” Decoupled 
income payments are approved under “green box” requirements as they reduce trade distortion by 
delinking the payment from the production and prices of specific agricultural commodities.  
The first efforts to move toward decoupling of agricultural support were made by the United 
States and the European Union in the 1985 Farm Bill and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
Reform of 1992, respectively. The United States and European Union’s agricultural markets are 
much more highly developed than that of Mexico, so when Mexico implemented a decoupled 
income payment system, PROCAMPO, in 1993 it was significant. Mexico’s program is an example 
                                                             
1 This round of agreements took place under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organization. As an 
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of how moving to decoupled income payments in agriculture can affect farmers in a less developed 
country. In particular, by examining this program I can see how the poorest agricultural regions in a 
developing country are affected by this form of decoupled payment.  This examination may provide 
details that assist other less developed countries in establishing similar programs, as international 
trade agreements further compel them in the coming years. Additionally, since the PROCAMPO 
program is scheduled to be dismantled in 2012, this study may provide details about how Mexico 
can best create a new program that benefits both large and small agricultural producers. Payments 
made for this program account for approximately 35% of the agricultural ministry’s annual budget 
(Zahniser 2004, 8). Therefore, developing an alternative to this program will be important in the 
coming years.  
1.2. Contributions 
There have been many studies that analyze the effects of instituting a decoupled income 
payment system. The majority of these focus on the agricultural markets of the United States and 
the European Union. One study found that these payments can affect production depending on a 
producer’s degree of credit constraint (Girante 2008). However, an additional study shows that at an 
aggregate level, decoupled income payments have not led to an increase in on-farm investment 
(Burfisher 2003). In developed countries, such as the United States and European Union, these 
payments also tend to be capitalized into land values and rents, which means that producers income 
actually increases very little (Ciaian 2008). I find fewer studies that look directly at the effect of the 
transition to decoupled income payment on less developed countries. 
In addition, studies have specifically analyzed the effects of trade liberalization on exports, 
prices, and producer income in Mexico. However, fewer studies examine the effects of NAFTA in 
relation to the PROCAMPO program. The majority of these studies use data from the late 1990s, so 
NAFTA and the PROCAMPO program would only have been in effect for a few years. They also 
tend to concentrate on small regions and ejidal lands2. By contrast, I use a unique county-level dataset 
in Mexico that includes the pre-NAFTA agricultural census and post-NAFTA county-level cropping 
information and government payments. Combining these data with population and economic 
censuses, I obtain information on population, education, infrastructure, and off-farm wages.  I also 
construct a measure of road distance to the United States to control for those counties with a greater 
change in market access due to NAFTA.  This complete dataset then provides me with the ability to 
                                                             
2 Ejidos are areas of land that the government had granted to a community of producers to farm under the land 
distribution policy of the 1920’s. 
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generate a broader view of crop changes across the entire country. Generating an econometric 
model using these data, I am able to see the effects that trade liberalization and the movement from 
commodity specific price supports to decoupled income payments have had on agriculture at a 
regional level in Mexico. In addition, I am able to see whether the effects of PROCAMPO were 
restricted to wealthy regions or whether they also afforded poorer producers agricultural 
opportunities.  
1.3. Hypotheses 
I develop several hypotheses in regards to the effects of trade liberalization and decoupled 
income payments on agricultural production in Mexico. First, I hypothesize that the shift from 
commodity specific price supports to decoupled income payments will be associated with a 
conversion to cash crops. Second, the implementation of NAFTA will also lead producers to 
transition to cash crop production particularly in those regions closest to the United States border. 
Last, I hypothesize that direct payments such as PROCAMPO will aid credit constrained producers 
to make the often substantial investments needed to switch to cash crop production.  
1.4. Overview 
First, I detail Mexico’s agricultural policy during the past twenty years. This includes 
programs and policies that were in place prior to the signing of NAFTA and those that were created 
to garner the benefits from trade liberalization.  Then I evaluate studies that have been conducted 
on these policies. Next, I present my conceptual model, which is based on agricultural household 
theory. This section includes a discussion detailing how my variables fit into the agricultural 
household construct. Then I describe my data and empirical model and present my results. Finally, I 
discuss my conclusions, future extensions, and applications.  
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2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Mexican government implemented several policy changes affecting agriculture prior to 
signing NAFTA in 1994 and several more throughout the implementation phase of the trade 
agreement. Entering into NAFTA signified Mexico’s intention to move away from a government 
supported agricultural market towards greater privatization and competition.  The hope was that 
some of these policy changes would help agricultural producers assimilate to the increased 
competition from the United States and Canada and allow them to benefit from the new markets 
made available by NAFTA.   
I would expect that Mexico would have a comparative advantage in the production of cash 
crops such as vegetables and fruits, whereas I would expect the United States to have a comparative 
advantage in corn with respect to Mexico.  Under the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, 
factor mobility is assumed to be costless. This is not the case in practice, and to benefit from trade, 
producers need access to credit to make changes in crop choice in response to changes in relative 
prices. Those who were already producing cash crops prior to NAFTA would benefit from trade. 
PROCAMPO then assists in redistributing the benefits to those who produced staple crops and 
would be made worse off by this free trade agreement.  Mexico’s trade in agricultural products with 
the United States and Canada has steadily grown in the past fifteen years, which is seen as a positive 
movement towards free trade and development. The full effect of these changes on individual 
agricultural producers, specifically the rural poor, is more difficult to determine.  
This background analysis begins with an overview of Mexico’s agricultural policy prior to the 
mid-1980s. The following section includes a discussion of the Mexican government’s move toward 
trade liberalization. Then I provide details regarding specific agricultural policies that were instituted 
in the 1990s along with a literature review of studies that have evaluated the programs’ effectiveness. 
These programs, specifically the decoupled income payment system, PROCAMPO, are meant to 
assist farmers in making the transition out of staple crop production. I also provide an overview of 
the accessibility of credit to the agricultural market. Finally, I present a timeline of trade liberalization 
events and other agricultural policies in Table 1.  
2.1. Agricultural Policy Prior to NAFTA and Trade Liberalization 
CONASUPO and Banrural 
Prior to the early 1990s, Mexico’s agricultural sector was heavily supported by the 
government. The government provided price supports, bought and distributed commodities, and 
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provided inputs and credit. CONASUPO (the National Company of Popular Subsistence) was the 
governmental agency that implemented these agricultural policies. It began in the mid-1960s and 
lasted through the late-1990s. CONASUPO’s goal was to create efficient relationships between 
producers and consumers. It attempted to protect both parties; it made food affordable for low-
income consumers and granted low-income producers the ability to obtain a certain level of 
livelihood from production (Yunez-Naude 2003, 98). This system of creating artificially high prices 
for producers and low prices for consumers was a large expense for the government. 
Before policy changes, eleven crops were supported by CONASUPO programs: barley, 
beans, copra, corn, cotton, rice, sesame, sorghum, soybeans, sunflower, and wheat. CONASUPO 
was responsible for buying these crops from producers, processing them to create consumer goods, 
and managing retail stores that sold the goods to consumers. This institution played an important 
role in that it provided both technical training and inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds, 
to agricultural producers. Finally, it is important to note that imports on all the crops subject to 
CONASUPO price supports were accompanied by strict import licenses, which limited international 
competition. 
Under the system of government-controlled agricultural markets, the government was also 
involved in providing credit to small scale agricultural producers. This access to credit was provided 
through the state-run bank, Banrural, which was established in 1975.  Banrural waived collateral 
requirements and had low penalties for default, so even producers that owned small areas of land or 
who were part of an ejido had access to credit. Ejidatarios were the recipients of approximately three 
quarters of the loans issued by Banrural.  Ejidal lands are those that are owned commonly by a 
community, and they tend to be of poor quality for agricultural production. These types of lands and 
the policies affecting them directly will be discussed in more detail later.   
Access to credit from Banrural was limited in several ways. First, only crops with guaranteed 
price supports through CONASUPO were eligible for financing. This constraint provided an 
incentive for producers to plant one of the eleven approved staple crops. Another issue was that 
inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides were often delivered in an untimely manner, which could 
delay planting and lead to lower yields.  Also producers could not choose the type of seed, fertilizer, 
and pesticides used, as they were provided directly by Banrural (Heath 1992, 699). These limitations 
all caused Banrural financing to be less than efficient for the majority of small producers.  
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Trade Liberalization 
In the mid-1980s, Mexico’s government started to make the shift towards the liberalization 
of trade.  This move was partly a result of the world market becoming more interdependent through 
trade. Mexico realized that to achieve sustained growth, they also needed to open their markets to 
international trade. One of the first steps in this process was joining the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1985. Joining GATT allowed them to focus on increasing their exports 
to the world market.  
Even after joining GATT, Mexico still operated under somewhat restricted trade through 
the use of tariffs, quotas, and price supports. By entering into NAFTA with the United States and 
Canada in January 1994, many of these barriers to trade were lifted. Since the implementation of 
NAFTA, Mexico’s exports to the United States have increased substantially.  According to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Mexico’s average total exports to the United States in the 
period between 1991 and 1993 were $2.5 billion U.S. dollars. By 2006-08 the average amount of 
exports to the United States was $10.2 billion U.S. dollars, which is an inflation-adjusted 299% 
increase (Zahniser 2009, 47). The actual volume of trade as a share of GDP has also increased, from 
20% in 1980, to 40% in 1994, and to 70% in 2003 (Randall 2006, 78).  These numbers show that 
Mexico’s trade with the United States and Canada has increased, and some Mexicans have benefited 
from this trade. The full effect of these changes on individual agricultural producers, specifically the 
rural poor, is more difficult to determine.  
The question remains as to who in Mexico benefited from this trade. The World Bank 
reported that in 2002, 20.3% of the Mexican population was living below the national poverty line. 
Poverty is even greater in rural areas, where 34.8% percent of the population live below the national 
poverty line (World Bank 2008, 17). The Gini Coefficient, which measures income distribution, 
shows that the income disparity between rich and poor in Mexico has diminished slightly since 
NAFTA but still remains relatively high as compared to other OECD3countries (World Bank 2009).  
As previously stated, poverty is extremely prevalent in rural Mexico. Therefore, to address 
the issue of poverty and the effects that international trade may have, Mexico needed to evaluate and 
modify its agricultural policies.  One of the general principles of development and reducing rural 
poverty is that it is necessary for a portion of workers to leave the farming sector, which allows for 
the consolidation of land and greater productivity. In 1991, 26.8% of the work force was engaged in 
agriculture. By 1998, only 20.2% of total employment was in the agricultural sector (Martin 2000, 
                                                             
3 OECD is the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, and consists of 31 countries.  
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10). By the mid-2000s, 15% of workers were employed in agriculture and less than four percent of 
Mexico’s GDP was obtained from agriculture (World Factbook 2009). This shows that in the past 
fifteen years, people have transitioned out of farm labor to employment in the industrial and service 
sectors. This transition is necessary for benefits to be gained from free trade.  
2.2. Agricultural and Rural Policies Post-NAFTA 
In the early to mid-1990s, several changes to the agricultural structure of Mexico were 
implemented. First, Article 27 was enacted in 1992, granting the right for ejido lands to be titled, 
bought, and sold. Then several programs were created specifically to address the issues that 
agricultural producers would face with increased competition from the United States and Canada.  
These programs tend to concentrate on providing agricultural producers transitional assistance so 
that they can benefit from trade.  Among these programs were ASERCA’s (Support Services for 
Agricultural Marketing) Target Income/Market Support Programs, PROCAMPO, and Alianza por el 
Campo (the Alliance for the Countryside, also known as Alianza). One additional program that will 
be discussed is PROGRESA (Program for Education, Health, and Nutrition), which is a social 
policy but has implications for rural agricultural producers. In many cases the same family could be 
receiving conditional cash transfers through PROCAMPO and PROGRESA, as well as agricultural 
assistance through Alianza. Therefore the assistance provided by these programs can have a large 
impact on the overall income of an agricultural family. Finally, I discuss the dismantling of Banrural 
and the creation of Financiera Rural, along with its impacts on the credit market for small-scale 
agricultural producers.  
Article 27 
In 1992, Article 27 altered the ejidal structure allowing for the private ownership of what had 
previously been collectively held land.  Ejido’s are areas of land that the government had granted to a 
community of producers to farm under the land distribution policy of the 1920’s. These community 
lands often caused tension among neighbors, especially if clear title and regulations for use of the 
community lands were not appropriately established. The changes made to the ejidal structure in 
1992 were in response to political pressure and discontent from within the ejidal communities. 
Previously, the ejidatarios did not own the land and therefore were unable to use it for collateral to 
obtain loans from privately owned banks. As noted above, the Mexican government did however 
provide price supports, technical assistance, and credit through Banrural which compensated 
somewhat for the lack of credit from private sources. With Article 27, land rights were granted so 
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that land could be sold or used for loan collateral. However, the price supports and technical 
assistance to the ejidos were discontinued.  
In the early 1990s, ejidos constituted almost half of the farmland in Mexico and contained 
three quarters of the countries agricultural producers (Cord 2001, 2). These ejido lands tend to be of 
poor quality without irrigation and the ejidatarios generally have little access to machinery, improved 
seed, and newer pesticides. Due to the fact that the land was of poor quality, only 5 percent of ejido 
lands were sold after the reforms (Randall 2006, 213). There was also the issue of the ineffectiveness 
of PROCEDE4, the program that was supposed to certify the rights of ejido members to land. Very 
few ejidatarios actually went through the process of receiving title to their lands. The idea was that if 
they had clear title of the land they would be more incented to make investments that would 
increase efficiency and production; however this objective was not fulfilled.  
Target Income/Market Support Program 
In 1991, Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA) established the Support and Services for 
Agricultural Marketing (ASERCA).  ASERCA has two main functions, the first being to administer 
the Target Income/Market Support Program. This program’s purpose is to strengthen agricultural 
trade by building markets between producers and purchasers. This program’s objectives include 
distributing marketing information to agricultural producers in order to increase exports. The Target 
Income/Market Support Program also assists in creating a market for hedging price risk.  
The majority of the support provided by this program specifically targets medium to large 
producers who are exporting grains and oilseeds. According to the World Bank, approximately 
67,000 agricultural producers received support from this program in 2000 with the average amount 
paid being $5,200 U.S. dollars (Income 2005, 252). Based on this information and the large amount 
given per producer, I infer that this assistance has gone mainly to large producers. There has also 
been geographic disparity, shown by the fact that four states, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and 
Guanajuato, received over 80% of these funds. (Income 2005, 252) These states have many large 
agricultural producers as they are further north and are heavily involved in exporting agricultural 
commodities to the United States and Canada. Therefore I find little evidence that this program 
helped small-scale producers who have few excess crops to sell in the market or lack the 
infrastructure, roads, and transportation needed to move their crops to the market. 
  
                                                             
4 PROCEDE is the Program for Certification of Rights to Ejido Lands. 
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PROCAMPO 
The second main function of ASERCA is to oversee the PROCAMPO program. 
PROCAMPO was specifically created to address the effects that NAFTA would have on Mexican 
agricultural producers. Among these concerns were that foreign competition as well as structural 
changes in Mexican agricultural policy would lead to an increase in poverty in rural farming 
communities from the loss of import subsidies, price supports, and import protection. The 
PROCAMPO program represented a shift from price-based supports to direct income subsidies to 
producers. Initiating a cash transfer program allows the government to assist the producers without 
distorting the market price for the various crops. It also tends to have lower administrative costs.  
Producers of any of nine crops would receive payments based on the number of hectares 
planted for the three crop-cycles preceding the August 1993 reforms. These crops included barley, 
beans, maize, cotton, rice, sorghum, soy, sunflower, and wheat.  The payments are made per hectare 
farmed each crop season and are not tied to what crop is produced after 1993. This allows for 
farmers to change which crops they produce, such as a movement towards fruits and vegetables, 
while continuing to receive the payments. Producers are also allowed to transfer land use to farm 
livestock, forestry, or any ecological project and still continue to receive payments.  Additionally, 
farmers are able to continue receiving PROCAMPO payments regardless of actual crop yield or 
sales. The majority of producers only receive one PROCAMPO payment per year; however, since 
there are two growing seasons, those with access to irrigation may be able to farm all year and 
receive the second payment (Ruiz-Arranz 2006, 6). 
It is important to note that only farmers who could prove that they had farmed one of the 
nine eligible crops prior to 1993 will receive payments, therefore new producers cannot benefit from 
this program. To give a better idea of the size of this program, in 2003 approximately 2.8 million 
farmers received PROCAMPO payments for 13.7 million hectares of land. The payment per hectare 
in 2003 was approximately 950 pesos ($90 USD). Since acreage enrolled in this program was fixed in 
1993, these numbers have changed very little over the last decade.  Producers must apply for 
payments each agricultural year and are asked to provide proof of planting, however there is very 
little monitoring to see if the land actually is under cultivation.  Applications and payments are 
obtained from the Center for the Assistance of Rural Development (CADER) offices and payments 
are received after planting.  
The way in which PROCAMPO payments have been distributed has been altered over the 
life of the program in response to producers’ needs as well as administrative costs. Under the 
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“traditional PROCAMPO” program, all producers that farm over five hectares must send 
applications to the CADER offices after sowing as was mentioned previously. The “anticipated 
PROCAMPO” program was instituted in 2001. This program allows for producers who plant less 
than five hectares to receive payment prior to planting. According to an OECD study, over one 
third of the land and three quarters of the producers now receive their payments through this 
program (OECD 2007, 104). Receiving these payments before the start of the agricultural season 
provides producers the funds to purchase inputs prior to planting, which is especially important to 
small producers who may not have access to traditional credit. Lastly, there is “capitalized 
PROCAMPO” which was introduced in 2002. This method of payment allows producers to use all 
future PROCAMPO payments (through the life of the program) as collateral. However, this is a 
more technical process as producers must submit their proposed project for capital improvement to 
both the CADER offices and credit institutions. As of 2006 approximately twenty percent of 
PROCAMPO beneficiaries were participating in the “capitalized PROCAMPO” program (Winters 
2007, 620-621). 
One initial criticism of PROCAMPO was that the payments may primarily benefit large 
producers, who would have been able to transition to cash crop production without the extra 
financial help. Approximately ninety percent of producers receiving PROCAMPO payments 
cultivated less than five hectares, yet they only receive about half of the amount of the total 
payments (Cord 2001, 4). However, an interesting element of this program is that small producers 
may benefit relatively more from the program since the payment is made per hectare farmed and is 
not based on actual yield. Therefore a producer can be technically inefficient and still receive the 
same payment as someone who has improved seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment. One 
additional note regarding PROCAMPO is that under this system more subsistence farmers receive 
financial benefits. Under the previous system of price supports, CONASUPO, most of the rural 
poor did not benefit from the price supports as they did not produce enough to sell. The 
PROCAMPO program is then seen as having a positive effect on raising agricultural producers’ 
incomes and reducing rural poverty.  
One purpose of PROCAMPO, as a government sponsored cash transfer program, is to 
provide supplemental income to the producers. These cash transfers can also have indirect effects if 
the payments are invested into productivity-improving resources.  Since PROCAMPO payments are 
made regardless of yield, farmers can depend on them and therefore may be willing to use payments 
to invest in improvements. For example, a farmer who wants to purchase a piece of farm equipment 
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may be more likely to do so because he can depend on the incoming PROCAMPO payments to 
help him pay off the loan on the equipment.  Therefore the poor are more likely to make riskier 
decisions based on knowledge of incoming funds (Cord 2001, 10). They may also be more willing to 
make the capital investment necessary to transition from producing only staple crops, to the 
production of cash crops.   
Several studies have examined the effects the PROCAMPO program has had on rural 
agricultural producers. A study conducted by Cord and Wodon, using ejido household level data 
from 1994-1997, found that “participation in PROCAMPO significantly reduces the likelihood that 
ejido households will be poor” (Cord 2001, 1). They also found that PROCAMPO had a positive 
multiplier effect on household income. Sadoulet and de Janvry conducted a study analyzing both the 
direct and indirect effects of PROCAMPO on Mexican producers.  They specifically looked at the 
effects of PROCAMPO payments to 958 ejido households using data from 1994 and 1997. They 
concluded that the multiplier effect from PROCAMPO payments was in the range of 1.5 to 2.6 
(Sadoulet 2001, 1043). This finding means that for every one peso that a producer receives through 
this program, he is able to generate 0.5 to 1.6 additional pesos through production activities. Both 
studies show that these payments have a positive effect on increasing small-scale producers’ 
incomes. However, neither study specifically discusses the use of these funds as transitional support 
to move toward the production of cash crops.  
PROCAMPO was initially set up to span the 15-year transitional period established by 
NAFTA and would therefore be discontinued in December 2008. The funding was scheduled to 
slowly decline over this 15-year period.  This period was to give Mexican farmers time to modify 
land use and adopt new technologies. A 2005 World Bank study estimates that approximately 85% 
of individuals within ejidos received PROCAMPO payments. PROCAMPO payments, along with 
PROGRESA payments for nutrition and education, account for 15% of the income of the rural 
poor (Income 2005, 248-249). Yunez-Naude and Taylor estimate that the “termination of 
PROCAMPO subsidies would have a negative impact on incomes, ranging from a one percent to a 
four percent loss for most household groups” (Yunez-Naude 2006, 173).  These negative impacts 
will be the greatest in the ejido communities of Central and South Mexico.  In 2007, President 
Calderon announced that he would extend the PROCAMPO program for an additional four years. 
Therefore it is currently set to be dismantled in 2012. Due to heavy dependence on these subsidies 
by the rural poor, it would be difficult to completely eliminate the program, and a new type of 
agricultural assistance program will be necessary.   
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As discussed in my motivation section, the positive aspect of the PROCAMPO program is 
that it is less trade-distorting than the system of price supports that had been in place prior to the 
early 1990s. According to the WTO, direct payments to agricultural producers that are decoupled 
from production are considered “green box” subsidies and do not distort trade. By moving to this 
system they are in effect making themselves more available to trade. The government has also 
reduced its overall support to agriculture over the past twenty years. In 1986-1988, the OECD cited 
that producer support estimates as a percent of gross receipts was 28%. In 2004-2006, the 
percentage of support was cut to 21% (OECD 2009). Therefore, overall, the government is 
supporting agriculture less than it did under the state controlled system.  
Alianza por el Campo  
Alianza was formed in 1996. It was designed to assist in increasing agricultural and rural 
infrastructure.  Rural Mexican agricultural producers tend to have low yields and low rates of 
technological adoption. The main objectives of Alianza are to increase rural agricultural producers’ 
incomes, to create food security, and to improve the balance of trade. This program is somewhat 
decentralized in that funds to support the various programs come from both the federal and state 
governments. A benefit of this structure is that states can specifically pick the programs they think 
will most benefit the agricultural producers in their state. This system makes it more responsive to 
farmers needs, similar to the concept of extensions in the United States. Alianza has four main 
programs: agricultural improvement, livestock improvement, rural development, and sanitation. 
Here are a few of the many specific programs that are in operation: fertile-irrigation, mechanization, 
kilo per kilo, soybean, cotton, oil palm, coconut palm, citrus, ornamental horticulture, saline soil 
recovery, pasture land development, better livestock, animal genetic improvement, dairy promotion, 
integrated livestock development, technology transfer, animal health, and vegetable protection 
(Suvedi 2000, 4-5). 
Cord and Wodon conducted a study examining the effects that Alianza payments had on 
agricultural producers’ incomes. Their evaluation of Alianza showed that ejidatario participation in 
Alianza had “no significant impact on the household’s poverty” (Cord 2001, 2).  This may imply that 
only the middle and large producers reap the benefits of this program. However, their study was 
conducted using data from 1994-1997, at which point Alianza had only been in existence for one 
year.  This may explain the lack of effect. It often takes several years for information regarding 
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federal programs to reach the rural producers and for them to understand how to go about applying 
to receive the payments.  
PROGRESA/Oportunidades 
Although not an explicit agricultural program, the Program for Education, Health, and 
Nutrition (PROGRESA), which was established in 1997 by the federal government of Mexico, does 
channel assistance to the rural poor. The goal of the program is to alleviate poverty by providing 
conditional cash payment transfers to women, provided that they send their children to school and 
see that they have regular medical visits.  By conditioning the payments on children’s education, 
medical check-ups, and improved nutrition they are attempting to improve the human capital of the 
rural poor. The program is specifically targeted to the poorest households in rural Mexico. Eligibility 
was first determined by identifying poor communities based on an index that was compiled using 
factors such as percentage of illiterate adults, access to water, access to drainage, dwelling with a dirt 
floor, etc. (Ruiz-Arranz 2006, 7). Households were then chosen from within these communities 
based on household surveys and levels of poverty.  
The payments are provided for three different areas: education, health, and nutrition. With 
respect to education, the government provides scholarships to each child enrolled in school for the 
purpose of purchasing school equipment. By making payments contingent on school attendance, 
parents are less likely to keep their children at home as source of farm labor. The program also 
provides for free basic health care for women and children, which includes prenatal care. Pregnant 
women and children under the age of two are also provided with access to nutritional supplements. 
This is extremely important because prenatal malnutrition, as well as in the first 24 months of a 
child’s life, can cause permanent stunting of mental and physical development.  For the nutrition 
part of the program, a direct cash payment is made that allows families to purchase food. As part of 
this program, mothers are required to attend informational sessions on nutrition.  This provides 
more food for children, enhancing their chances of excelling in school. The important part of this 
program is that women are recipients of the payments because they are more likely than to use the 
payments in ways which benefit of their children.   
A study conducted by Ruiz-Arranz (2006) looked at the impact of conditional cash transfer 
programs on food security in rural Mexico. Food security involves the ability to produce enough 
food and/or have enough income to purchase food. They found that PROGRESA did have a 
positive effect on food consumption and caloric intake. These payments also led to increased 
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diversity in the types of foods consumed. This may be due to the fact that a cash payment will incent 
them to purchase from the market, instead of only eating what they produce.  
These payments are very important to the rural poor. A study by the World Bank shows that 
of households receiving PROGRESA payments, one fifth of their income comes from this program. 
PROGRESA is now called Oportunidades, and in April of 2009 the World Bank provided $1.5 million 
U.S. dollars to the Mexican government to assist them in expanding the program (World Bank (2), 
2009). The main reasons for their continued investment is that studies of the program have shown 
that the number of individuals from rural areas enrolled in tertiary schools has nearly doubled, 
anemia in children under two years of age has dropped by 12.8 percent, and children under five 
years old have 20 percent fewer sick days (World Bank(2), 2009). These are substantial numbers and 
show the value of investing in programs such as this to combat poverty via supporting education, 
health, and nutrition. 
Privatization of Banking 
The privatization of state-owned banks in the early 1990s was of critical importance to 
agricultural producers. The belief was that when privatization occurred, the private banks would 
provide the necessary loans to the agricultural producers, both small and large. This surge in private 
lending did not occur; currently agriculture accounts for a very small part of bank lending (only 4.5 
percent in 2001), and practically no commercial bank lending goes to small farmers (Income 2005, 
235). Banrural was eventually dissolved in 2003 and replaced by the Financiera Rural, whose main 
purpose is to make loans to agricultural producers. Financiera Rural lends to individual rural 
producers as well as rural enterprises, financial intermediaries, and informal credit organizations. 
Financiera Rural also claims to provide training and advisory services to assist rural farmers in making 
better credit decisions. As of 2009, Financiera Rural has granted over five hundred thousand rural 
loans, totaling over seven billion U.S. dollars (Financiera Rural 2009). It is not known whether the 
beneficiaries of these loans have been the poorest producers. 
However, it is known that access to credit is an important factor in lifting rural agricultural 
producers out of poverty, especially after the removal of price supports, technical assistance, and 
government provided fertilizers and pesticides.  Agricultural development involves the ability to 
generate an increased amount of output (crop) per hectare and per worker.  Therefore, there is a 
heavy reliance on access to credit in order to purchase inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, water 
(irrigation), and machinery such as tractors. Without access to credit, the majority of the poor, 
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subsistence agricultural producers are unable to purchase these inputs that can help them modernize 
and increase their yields per hectare. They are also unable to make the capital investment necessary 
to transition to cash crop production and fully realize the benefits from trade.  
Access to both short-term credit and long-term credit is needed. Short-term credit is 
necessary for farmers to buy inputs like new varieties of seeds and fertilizers, as the input is needed 
well before the yield is known. This access to credit helps mitigate some of the risk for the producer. 
Long-term credit is also often needed to buy machinery or more land, because farmers need 
flexibility in repaying these loans over a long period of time due to the inherent uncertainty in 
agriculture. In the long-term, if only the medium-sized and large producers can afford to purchase 
the inputs, their yields will go up relative to the smaller farmers.  The aggregate effect will be to 
increase the supply and depress the market price of the crop. Therefore, lack of credit may severely 
hurt the smaller farmers’ ability to exist. Providing agricultural credit to the lowest income producers 
is then necessary for equitable development.  
To further complicate the credit situation, in late 1994 the peso was devalued, causing an 
increase in inflation and led to a severe recession in Mexico, often referred to as the Peso Crisis. 
Loans from the United States government allowed for Mexico to emerge from this recession in the 
late 1990s. However the recession may have caused a delay in the benefits that producers saw from 
the free trade agreement.   
2.3. Summary 
By providing this background regarding the various agricultural and rural policies that have 
been enacted since the early 1990s, I hope to provide a foundation for my study. First, I find 
evidence to support the idea that many agricultural producers are credit constrained. A compelling 
indication of the current credit constraint is the fact that credit was previously provided by the 
government, and with the privatization of banking, fewer small scale producers have access to credit. 
Secondly, the government clearly recognizes this credit constraint, signified by the fact that they 
moved to issue PROCAMPO payments before planting and provided for the ability to capitalize 
PROCAMPO payments to use as collateral for loans. I ask whether PROCAMPO helps alleviate 
this credit constraint so that producers can use these payments to transition from staple crop 
production to higher value cash crops, which can be sold both in local and international markets.  
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3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
3.1. Agricultural Household Models 
To consider the forces that affect crop choice, I use the agricultural household model. The 
agricultural household model has been used extensively in the past twenty years for examining the 
effects of policy changes on agricultural households in developing countries. The original model 
developed by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) brought to light the main difficulty in studying 
agricultural households; these households are both consumers and producers. Therefore consumer 
and producer theory must be combined to create a model that truly reflects decision making in a 
dynamic agricultural household. Additionally, determining the effects of government policies 
becomes more complex as these policies can affect production levels as well as consumption and the 
labor supply (Singh 1986, 149). It is important to note that the specifications and assumptions that 
researchers make in their agricultural household models vary extensively depending on the type of 
policy they are examining.  
The decisions that farm households make regarding what to consume and produce are 
directly linked, and these decisions are often made simultaneously. Many agricultural households sell 
as well as consume the goods that they produce. They must choose how to allocate their production 
resources, including labor and other purchased inputs such as fertilizer and seed. As consumers, they 
also decide how to allocate income, from farm and off-farm activities, for the consumption of 
purchased goods and services. This model must also be able to incorporate various types of farm 
households, including the net-surplus producing farm family, the subsistence farm family, small scale 
renters, and owner-operated commercial farms (Taylor 2003, 34-35). It is important that the model 
can reflect all these groups, as it is typical in developing countries to have all four varieties of 
agricultural households.  
Many of the assumptions made in economic modeling do not hold for developing countries. 
For example, the assumption of perfect markets can alter results significantly as many agricultural 
producers in Mexico face imperfect markets in which transaction costs are often extremely high. 
Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) used an agricultural household model to determine the effect of 
transaction costs on production choices made by rural households in Mexico. They created a model 
that accounts for the different relationships that farm households have with the market, as this 
relationship determines responsiveness to price. In their model, the household maximizes utility 
subject to a cash constraint, resource balance constraint, and a production technology constraint. 
They discussed both proportional and fixed costs and how fluctuations in these costs can cause 
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households to either leave or enter the market. They found that both types of transactions costs are 
significant, but that proportional transaction costs are most significant when households are 
deciding whether to sell in the market (Key 2000, 258). 
Taylor, Dyer, and Yunez-Naude (2005) created a disaggregated rural economy-wide model 
using data from west-central Mexico to show that lower maize prices have negative income effects 
on both large and small scale producers. They noted, however, that these income effects are very 
small for subsistence producers, as the direct income payments from PROCAMPO and 
PROGRESA helped offset the negative income effect from the decrease in the price of maize 
(Taylor 2005, 1681). They also conducted an experiment in which they converted the current 
PROCAMPO payments to the previous system of price supports. From this simulation they 
concluded that maize production on commercial farms would have been substantially higher, 12%, 
whereas subsistence production of maize would have slightly decreased, less than 0.26%. 
As stated in consumer theory, the goal of a household is to maximize its utility subject to 
various constraints. These constraints vary, but can include income, time, land and other productive 
assets, the price of inputs, the market price of crops, and the price of other purchased goods.  As 
producers, they also make decisions to maximize profits. Taylor and Adelman (2003) proposed that 
the solution to this model produces a set of “equations for outputs, input demands, consumption 
demand, and either prices (for household non-tradables) or marketed surplus (for household 
tradables)” (Taylor 2003, 34-35). Therefore, all endogenous variables are represented as functions of 
exogenous variables. These exogenous variables may include government policies, prices of various 
crops, farm equipment, technology, and credit. In addition, the family budget is endogenous in the 
household model and depends directly on production and farm profits (Taylor 2003, 36).  
3.2. Basic Model 
In my basic agricultural household model, households choose the level of land 𝑛 , labor 𝑙 , 
variable inputs 𝑣 , and capital 𝑘  to invest in the production of staples(𝑞
1
) and cash crops(𝑞
2
). I 
assume these choices are made to maximize utility from consumption of staple crops and all other 
goods purchased in the market, x1 and x0 , respectively. I use x0 as my numeraire good, with price 
p0=1. The model is based on the period of one agricultural year, with the agricultural year starting 
just prior to planting.  Therefore the utility function for my household model is: 
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𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑈 𝑥1, 𝑥0  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: 
Budget Constraint 
 𝑞1
𝑚  𝑝1 − 𝑣1 + 𝑞2 𝑝2 − 𝑣2 − 𝑚  + 𝜔𝑡−1 + 𝑔 + (𝑤 ∙ 𝑙𝑧)− 𝑘2 − 𝑥0 ≥ 𝜔𝑡  
Production Function – Staple Crops 
𝑞1 = 𝑓(𝑛1, 𝑙1, 𝑣1) 
Production Function – Cash Crops 
𝑞2 = 𝑗(𝑛2, 𝑙2, 𝑣2, 𝑘2) 
Land Constraint 
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 ≤ 𝑛 
Labor Constraint 
𝑙1 + 𝑙2 + 𝑙𝑧 ≤ 𝑙 
Staple Crop Constraint 
𝑞1
𝑚 + 𝑥1 ≤ 𝑞1 
If credit constrained the following must also be true: 
𝑔 + 𝜔𝑡−1 + (𝑤 ∙ 𝑙𝑧) − 𝑣1 − 𝑣2 − 𝑘2 ≥ 0 
 
Income from agricultural production consists of the price(𝑝1, 𝑝2) they receive for the crops 
they sell in the market minus variable costs(𝑣1, 𝑣2) and transaction costs of getting the crop to 
market(𝑚) times the quantity sold in the marketplace. Second, any wealth endowment(𝜔𝑡−1), which 
I define as cash carried over from the previous agricultural cycle, government payments(𝑔), 
including PROCAMPO, PROGRESA, and other market support programs, and off-farm wages 
(𝑤 ∙ 𝑙𝑧) are added to this amount. Lastly, the cost of capital investments necessary to transition to 
cash crop production(𝑘2) and the cost of consumption goods 𝑥0  are subtracted from the 
household’s income. I assume that not all incoming money is spent but that some is saved to be 
used in the next agricultural cycle(ωt).  
In my model each farm produces only two goods, staple crops and cash crops. Production 
of each good is a function of land(𝑛1, 𝑛2), labor(𝑙1, 𝑙2), and variable input costs(𝑣1, 𝑣2). 
Additionally, I assume that capital requirements(𝑘2) are needed only for cash crop production. In 
addition, I include three inequality constraints. First, the land planted in staples plus the land planted 
in cash crops must be less than or equal to the total available agricultural land.  Second, the labor 
used for staple crop production, cash crop production, and earning off-farm wages must be equal or 
less to the total amount of labor hours possible. Third, the quantity of staples sent to the market and 
the quantity of staples consumed by the household must be less than or equal to the total 
production of staples. Cash crops are being produced primarily for the market and therefore are not 
being consumed by the household.  
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Additionally, I assume that producers have some access to credit, and that their credit access 
is related to their existing wealth or government payments. This access to credit means that the 
producers have the cash available to make capital investments at the beginning of the agricultural 
year prior to planting. If I assume that the producers are credit constrained, then the last constraint 
must be true, which states that current government payments, wealth, and off-farm income minus 
variable costs and the investment in capital for cash crop production must be greater than or equal 
to zero. This assumption is based on the discussion of credit in the previous section.5  
The econometric model I construct is at the county, not agricultural household level. 
However, I make the assumption that agricultural households within a county are relatively 
homogenous. Statistics to support this assumption will be discussed in my data section. I propose 
that the agricultural household model will show that the change in the percent of land in cash crops 
as a percent of the change in government payments will be greater than zero, ∂
n2i
n i
∂gi > 0. This 
supports my hypothesis that PROCAMPO payments assist people in moving from staple crop 
production to cash crop production. If I assume homogenous counties, then I can sum this up to 
the county level, ∂
n2i
n i
 ∂gi > 0. 
This model gives some insight as to how household factors might affect the observed 
percent of land planted in cash crops versus staple crops. There is very little capital investment in 
planting staples, as many of these producers have been in agricultural production of crops, such as 
corn and beans, for generations. There is a cost to purchasing the inputs and machinery necessary to 
grow certain cash crops. The ability of the household to make this transition depends on many of 
the factors that are in my model. For example, the prices of staple crops and cash crops, as well as 
the transaction costs related to transporting them to the market, will affect whether a producer will 
grow cash crops. The decision to grow cash crops also depends on whether farmers have cash 
available from the previous agricultural season or incoming cash from off-farm activities that can be 
added to government payments in order to make an investment prior to planting.  
The above model also gives some insight as to determinants of regional crop choice after 
NAFTA, and how it might be affected by government payments. NAFTA reduced market barriers 
which directly affected the price that producers would receive for their crops. I assume that after 
NAFTA was implemented, staple prices decreased due to increased competition from the United 
                                                             
5 I do not observe credit in my base model, as the data is only available at the state level; therefore, I will examine credit 
in a separate model.  
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States and Canadian markets. The removal of government price supports would also cause the price 
that the farmer received for staple crops to decrease. PROCAMPO was targeted to assist agricultural 
producers in making crop choice changes by increasing their incomes to offset lower prices during 
this transition time period. Since PROCAMPO directly affects the agricultural producers in the form 
of cash payments, its effects should be captured by this model. These direct payments may then 
lower the cost of transitioning from staple to cash crops, allowing producers who previously did not 
sell their agricultural goods to now have access to markets.  
Alternatively, since NAFTA has opened the United States and Canadian markets, it has 
created a new market for cash crops, including fruits and vegetables. Please refer to Table A.1 in the 
Appendix, which shows the prices of corn, staples, and all other crops for 1991, 2001, and 2003. 
This information was obtained directly from my data and shows that the price of corn and staples 
decreased from 2001 to 2003, whereas the price for all other crops increased during the same period. 
Therefore, those producers who have the resources to make the transition out of staples production 
and have relatively low transaction costs to market could see an increase in income.  
To build an empirical model I need data on government payments to agricultural 
households, including programs that are specifically targeted to the rural poor. Data on farmer 
characteristics, including infrastructure and education variables, also play a role in my model.  To see 
if there has been a change in crop choice due to various policies, it is necessary to obtain data on 
agricultural areas planted, volume harvested, and the value of the harvested crops. Since my data is 
at the county level, I assume that the producers within each county are relatively homogenous and 
that they are price takers. This model allows me to see what effects external policies, NAFTA and 
PROCAMPO, have had on counties across Mexico. My model takes into account two of the main 
activities in which rural households may be involved, including staple and cash crop production. My 
income sources are agricultural sales, cash transfers (PROCAMPO and PROGRESA), and other 
government payments. 
3.3. Framework for Variable Choice 
As discussed above, several factors might affect the crop choices made by agricultural 
producers in Mexico after NAFTA went into effect and price supports were eliminated. I believe 
that the following variables help to explain why the choice to move from staple crop production to 
cash crop production will be made. However, I am constrained by the data available from the 
Mexican government which will be discussed further in my data section.   
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My main dependent variable is the percent of agricultural land planted in staples.6 I chose 
this as my dependent variable as one of the purposes of PROCAMPO payments is to assist 
producers in moving out of staple crop production towards the production of crops with a higher 
market value. I define staples as the nine crops that are eligible to receive PROCAMPO payments. 
These crops include barley, beans, maize, cotton, rice, sorghum, soy, sunflower, and wheat.  
My independent variables include those that represent local market demand, transportation 
costs, transition costs, and the effects of governmental policies. My market demand variables are 
total population in thousands and wages per worker.7 The wages per worker variable only includes 
wages from manufacturing, wholesale/retail, and services sectors. It does not contain information 
on agricultural wages, which allows me to refer to it as off-farm wages. This measure of income 
provides me with an idea of the market demand for cash crops, as Bennet’s Law states that as 
incomes increase the per capita consumption of starchy staple crops will fall. Therefore an increase 
in demand for cash crops should cause the price of cash crops(𝑝2) to increase, which will provide 
additional incentives for producers to switch to cash crop production. Even though I mention labor 
in my model, I do not actually have data on the division of labor. Therefore labor will not be 
included in the econometric analysis.  
The distance to the United States border along with local infrastructure may affect the 
transaction costs associated with participating in the market opportunities created by NAFTA. The 
distance variable is the road distance, in thousands of kilometers, from each county seat to the 
closest United States border crossing point.8 I would expect that as distance from the border 
increases, transaction costs(𝑚) also increase. Therefore those producers further from the border will 
be more likely to stay in staple crop production, as the transportation costs to send cash crops to the 
market are too high. Conversely, this would mean that those areas closest to the border would have 
lower transaction costs and would therefore produce fewer staples after NAFTA.  
The infrastructure variable is an index of two infrastructure variables: percent of households 
with drainage and percent of households with sanitation.9 This index was created using factor 
analysis; this allows me to avoid some multicollinearity issues10 and gives me a proxy for households 
                                                             
6 This variable was created by dividing the area planted in staples by the total area planted of all crops. 
7 The log of both these variables has been taken because of their initial skewed distribution. 
8 This variable was created by Rafael Garduño-Rivera. Please reference Garduño-Rivera (2009) page 18 for more details. 
9 This variable was created by dividing the number of households that have this infrastructure by the total number of 
households in the county. 
10 These variables were created by Rafael Garduño-Rivera. Please reference Garduño-Rivera (2009) pages 18-19 for 
more details.  
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that are linked to sewage systems. Since sewage is much more common in developed urban areas 
this allows me to pull out details on how remoteness from markets may affect crop choice. I would 
expect that an increase in infrastructure would be associated with lower transaction costs(𝑚) as the 
producers may be close to a market.  
The two variables that I use to capture transition costs from staple to cash crops are literacy 
and education levels. I believe that those who are literate and have at least a high school education 
are better able to make the transition to cash crops.  Those who are literate tend to have greater 
access to market information. In addition, they may also be more likely to fill out applications for 
credit and funding from various government programs. Since these are often complicated 
documents, without literacy and education it would be very difficult to receive benefits from these 
institutions. My literacy variable shows the percent of people over the age of 15 that are literate in 
each county. The high school education variable shows the percent of people in a county that have 
received a high school degree. Based on this discussion I would expect that as education levels 
increase, the capital investment related to switching to cash crop production 𝑘2  will decrease.   
There are three variables that capture government policies, including PROCAMPO, 
PROGRESA, and other government payments. I ask whether or not these programs are alleviating 
the credit constraint of producers, which then enables them to make the transition from staple to 
cash crop production. The PROCAMPO payment per producer variable was created by dividing the 
total amount paid to a county by the number of producers that received the payments. This gives us 
a proxy for the liquidity constraint of producers.  The PROGRESA payment per person variable 
was generated by dividing the total amount of payments to a county by the population of the 
county.11 My total other government payments variable is total government payments made to 
agriculture divided by the number of farms in 1991.12 Total government payments include both 
federal and state funds distributed to programs for the improvement of the agricultural sector and 
rural communities. These programs include irrigation, infrastructure development, technical 
improvements, research and transfer, livestock development, health and food safety, and marketing 
support. My expectation is that all these payments(𝑔) would increase producers’ incomes, which 
would in turn reduce their credit constraint and allow them to transition to cash crop production. 
                                                             
11 The PROGRESA data does not contain total number of beneficiaries of payments per county and that is why total 
population was used. 
12 Since I did not have information on how many producers received these payments, I normalized the data using the 
number of farms in each county in 1991.  
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Therefore I would expect these programs to allow for producers to move out of staple crop 
production. 
I also created a dummy variable to represent NAFTA, where years prior to the 
implementation of NAFTA are zero and those years after NAFTA are one. Additionally, interaction 
terms between NAFTA and distance to the border, total population in thousands, and wages per 
worker were created. Creating these interaction terms allows me to isolate the effects of certain 
variables after NAFTA. For example, I expect the distance to the United States border to have a 
greater effect on staple crop production after NAFTA than before NAFTA. Those who are closer 
to the United States border should face lower transportation and transaction costs related to sending 
their crops to the United States and Canada, and therefore should be better able to transition out of 
staple crop production.  
Using this model and data, I draw out the effects that NAFTA and PROCAMPO have had 
on agricultural production in Mexico. Specifically, I demonstrate that decoupled income payments, 
PROCAMPO, are associated with conversion to cash crops. I also observe that the implementation 
of NAFTA is associated with greater cash crop production. Lastly, I am interested in seeing the 
distribution of the conversion to cash crop production across the whole country. I hypothesize that 
the areas closest to the United States border will see a greater movement to cash crop production 
after NAFTA.  
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4. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
4.1. Data 
The majority of the data used in this study was obtained from Mexico’s National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography, and Information (INGEGI). The infrastructure and economic data were 
obtained from Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos (SIMBAD) and come from the economic censuses 
of 1989, 1999, and 2004 and the general population censuses of 1990, 2000, and 2005.13 The 
agricultural data comes from the 1991 agricultural census and the annual agricultural yearbooks for 
the following agricultural years, 2000/2001 and 2002/2003. The PROCAMPO data and information 
on credit and other government payments was also obtained from the annual agricultural yearbooks 
for agricultural years 2000/2001 and 2002/2003. The PROGRESA/ Oportunidades data is the only 
data not provided by INEGI. It is available directly through the Oportunidades website for 2002 and 
2003. My final dataset contains information related to wealth, general agricultural production, 
producer characteristics, and program participation for a year prior to NAFTA and for two years 
after NAFTA was implemented. Please note that I have discounted all payments in pesos by the 
2003 Consumer Price Index. All my variables are further described in Table 2. 
From this data I formed a panel data set for the years, 1991, 2001, and 2003. To formulate 
three complete years, I had to move years of data slightly; however, I do not believe this change 
significantly alters any results. For the PROCAMPO, government payment, and credit data, 
agricultural year 2000/2001 was mapped to 2001, and 2002/2003 was mapped to 2003. For 
PROGRESA, agricultural year 2001/2002 was mapped to 2001 and 2003/2004 was mapped to 
2003. For the agricultural data, 1991 was left as is, while 2001/2002 was mapped to 2001 and 
2002/2003 was mapped to 2003. The economic and infrastructure data actually corresponds to 
1989, 1999 and 2004; however these were mapped to 1991, 2001, and 2003. This then gives us 
complete panel data for three years, 1991, 2001, and 2003. 
The crop and PROCAMPO data from the annual agricultural yearbooks was very disjointed 
as each state did not report the exact same variable. Because of this issue, my dataset includes only 
those variables for which data was reported for the majority of states. In addition, agricultural data 
for several states is only reported at the district level, which is a group of counties. Therefore eleven 
states, Baja California Norte, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Edo Mexico, Nuevo 
                                                             
13 This cleaned data file was obtained from Rafael Garduño-Rivera, for further details please reference Baylis, Garduño-
Rivera, Piras (2009), pp. 16. 
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Leon, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tlaxcala, will have all results reported at the district level.  Since 
the size (in square kilometers) for counties and districts varies widely, I weight the results by the 
agricultural area in each county and district. My agricultural base variable is used as the weight and 
was generated from the 1991 total agricultural hectares and the 2001 and 2003 agricultural area in 
hectares that received PROCAMPO payments. The greatest agricultural area was then drawn from 
each county to form the agricultural base variable.  
Additionally, the information on credit and other government payments to agriculture is only 
reported at the state level. The information for other government payments is distributed to the 
county and district level based on agricultural hectares in each county or district. The information on 
credit will only be evaluated at the state level, and all other variables will be summed up to the state 
level for my credit model.  
I have stated that producers are likely to want to switch crops in response to price changes 
resulting from NAFTA.  These price changes are likely not uniform across the country. To explore 
this regional variation in price, I use my data to generate the farm gate prices for corn in 1991 and 
2003 and tomatoes in 2003 by region relative to the national annual average.14  These prices can be 
seen in Table A.2. Some patterns are predictable. For example, in 2003 the price premium for corn 
is 0.63 pesos in the border region, whereas there is a price premium of 1.29 pesos in the southern 
region. This greater price premium in the southern region may provide an additional incentive for 
producers to stay in the production of staple crops, such as corn.  I can also see that the price 
premium for corn has decreased from 1991 to 2003 in the border and northern regions as well as 
the southern region. In addition, the price premium for tomatoes in the border and northern region 
is higher than the price premium for corn, which may explain why more producers in these regions 
have switched to cash crop production. These prices do not account for product quality but do 
provide evidence of regional differences in price premiums throughout Mexico.  
Test of County Homogeneity 
As was discussed in my conceptual model section, I am assuming that agricultural 
households within a county are relatively homogenous, since my data is at the county level. To 
support my assumption, I use individual census data from 1990 that comprises 10% of the 
population of Mexico. From this data I obtain the means and standard deviations both within and 
between counties. Please refer to Table A.3 for the results. I examine wages and education for those 
                                                             
14 I do not have price data for tomatoes in 1991. 
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working in agriculture and those who own agricultural land. The average of the variation of wages 
within a county is 1,095,499, whereas the national variance of county averages is 2,124,893. Like the 
latter number, my data is comprised of county-level means, which appear to have greater variation 
than within-county data. The education variable supports the same conclusion, as the average 
variance within a county is 0.6909 while the variance of county averages is 0.7444.  
These results have also been projected in histogram form. Figure A.1 is a histogram of the 
standard deviation of wages between counties. As seen in this histogram, the vast majority of 
observations are congregated around zero; however a few outliers cause the standard deviations as a 
whole to be altered. By examining the histogram for the education variable, Figure A.2, I see that the 
vast majority of the observations are congregated between zero and two. This information allows me 
to state that individuals who own their land and earn income from agricultural production are 
relatively homogenous within counties in Mexico.  
Additionally, I have access to geographic information such as elevation and climate. Please 
see Figure A.3 of the Appendix. These maps show the elevation levels and climate throughout the 
entire country of Mexico. Examining these maps provides further evidence that municipalities are 
fairly homogenous. Since I know that elevations and climates affect crop choice, it follows that 
producers within a county will face similar physical constraints. Agriculture in mountainous or arid 
areas is constrained by certain factors. Therefore, if the elevation and climate is similar for all 
producers within a county, they will tend to produce a set of similar crops. Producers within a 
county will also face similar water resources, which will directly affect which crops they are able to 
grow. 
4.2. Model 1: Percent of Agricultural Land in Staple Production  
Model Construction 
My first proposal is to examine the percent change in agricultural land used for the 
production of staple crops as a function of local market demand, transportation cost, transition cost, 
and government policies. 
% of land in staples=f(Local market demand, Transportation cost, Transition cost, Policies) 
1)  Local market demand = local population, local wages  
2)  Transportation cost = distance to the United States border   
3)  Transition cost = education  
4)  Policies = PROCAMPO payments, other government payments   
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Summary Statistics 
To better visualize the spatial distribution of my data across the whole country, I generated 
maps of all of the key variables. Please reference Figures 1-9. These were created by joining my data 
to a spatial file of all of Mexico’s counties in ESRI’s ArcGIS. For the majority of my variables, I 
created side by side maps, in which the data for 1991 is on the left-hand side and the data for 2003 is 
on the right-hand side. There are a few figures that are worth discussing in some detail. Figure 1 is 
my dependent variable, the percent of agricultural land planted in staples. Simply based on this 
projection of raw data, one can see that there are several regions in northern Mexico that produce 
less staples as a percentage of all crops than they did in 1991. Thus, some areas have reduced the 
amount of staple crops they produce since NAFTA. Figure 5 shows the percent of people within a 
county that have a high school education. As shown, these levels are fairly low across the whole 
country. However, education levels have risen over time and the counties that now have the highest 
percentage of high school educated people tend to be in the north-east and along the north-western 
coast. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the two variables that comprise my infrastructure index, the 
percent of households with drainage and the percent of households with sanitation. Overall, there 
has been increased investment in infrastructure from 1991 to 2003, as a much greater percentage of 
the population now has access to both drainage and sanitation. 
My PROCAMPO variable can be seen in Figure 8. Since this program was instituted after 
NAFTA, I only have data for 2001 and 2003. I have projected the data for 2003. Since I know that 
each hectare receives the same payment, the PROCAMPO payment per producer shows the farm 
size distribution across the country. I can see that many of the larger producers are in northern and 
central Mexico. I have also projected the PROCAMPO data as a percentage of total agricultural area. 
This shows that PROCAMPO payments are distributed throughout the entire country. I also map 
PROGRESA and other government payments for 2003. These can be seen in Figure 9. Since the 
PROGRESA program was targeted specifically at the rural poor, this map depicts the actual spatial 
distribution of the rural poor, who tend to be concentrated in central and southern Mexico. I can 
also see that the majority of other government payments are going to border states and a few states 
in central Mexico. For additional details, please reference Table 3 for summary statistics and Table 4 
for a correlation matrix of my main variables.  
Initial Regression Results 
Initially I ran five econometric models using the basic equation described above. These 
include 1) ordinary least squares (OLS), 2) fixed effects (FE), 3) fixed effects weighted by total 
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agricultural land (weighted FE), 4) random effects (RE), and 5) random effects weighted by total 
agricultural land (weighted RE).15 The results are detailed in Table 5. I find that population, 
government payments, and distance to the border are positive in all models and wages and high 
school completion are negative in all models. The only two variables that change signs across models 
are the infrastructure index and PROCAMPO; reasons for this will be discussed in detail later in this 
analysis.  
I know that an ordinary least squares (OLS) model will not be the most appropriate since my 
data is panel data, a cross-sectional dataset of information on the same counties over time; however, 
it is beneficial to look at the results generated from the OLS model. Population, PROCAMPO, 
government payments, and distance to the US border are all positive; however, government 
payments are not significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the population variable is significant 
and shows that for a 1% change in the population there is 7.3% increase in staple crop production. 
The wages per worker and high school education coefficients are both negative, as I would expect 
them to be. For a 1% increase in wages per worker there is a 3.1% decrease in staple crop 
production. The two variables that I am using to proxy for market demand, population and wages, 
are in effect offsetting each other, as one is positive and one is negative.  
The fixed effects (FE) model allows for the intercepts to vary across individuals, therefore an 
individual intercept for each county will be calculated. In doing this it strips out the entire cross 
sectional effect and leaves me only with variance over time. In my FE model, population, 
government payments, and distance to the border16 are all positive. This model has population 
playing a greater role than the OLS model, in that a 1% increase in the population leads to a 33.9% 
increase in staple production. The coefficients on wages per worker, high school education, and 
PROCAMPO payments are all negative. It is interesting that in the OLS model the coefficient on 
PROCAMPO had a positive sign, but in the FE model the sign switches to negative. Therefore for a 
1% increase in PROCAMPO payments there is a 6.6% decrease in the area planted in staples. A 
negative sign is what I hoped to see on the PROCAMPO variable, as it was a program that was 
targeted at reducing credit constraint and assisting producers in moving out of staple crop 
production.   
                                                             
15 I conducted the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. With the result being chi2(1) = 27.84 and 
Prob > chi2 =0.0000. Since heteroskedasticity is present I will use robust standard errors for all models. 
16 My distance to the US border variable is time-invariant. Therefore it is dropped by the fixed effects regression and 
absorbed by the intercept. The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) model created by Plümper and Troeger 
was used to obtain the coefficient distance to the US border. (Plümper 2007) 
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 The random effects (RE) model also allows for different intercepts, but instead of 
calculating them separately like the FE model does, it estimates a variance of the intercepts. The RE 
model allows cross-sectional variation to influence the estimates of the coefficients. Therefore the 
RE model enables me to see effects both over time and between counties. I use this model as I 
believe that there are differences across counties that have some influence on crop choice. Just like 
in the OLS and FE models, population, government payments, and distance to the border are 
positive, and wages and high school education are negative. The PROCAMPO coefficient is 
negative in this model, so for a 1% increase in PROCAMPO payments there is a 2.4% reduction in 
area planted in staples. The coefficient on government payments is not statistically significant in this 
model.  
Results from two other models, weighted FE and weighted RE, are also reported. I know 
that I need to weight the regression by total agricultural surface area as the counties and districts are 
of varying size. For example, the largest district has 3.7 million hectares of agricultural land (district 
in Coahuila) and the smallest county has only 1 hectare (district in Distrito Federal, which is Mexico 
City.) By creating a weighted version of both the FE and RE models, counties and district that are 
larger in land area will count more in the regression, a feature necessary for obtaining accurate 
results. I will discuss the weighted models in more detail in the next section. 
Main Model Results 
Next, I take the model constructed above but add in a NAFTA variable, which is my 
dummy variable where years after 1994 equal 1. I also constructed three interactions with NAFTA. 
Specifically, I interact NAFTA with my population, wages per worker, and distance to the border 
variables. This will allow me to determine if the effects of these variables on staple crop production 
changes after NAFTA. I then ran both weighted FE and weighted RE models. These results can be 
seen in Table 6.1. 
I will examine the weighted FE in comparison to the weighted RE model with my 
dependent variable being the percent of agricultural land in staples. The weighted FE model will be 
what I refer to as my main model in later discussions. 17  For the FE model all my variables are 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level except for wages and the infrastructure index. For the 
RE model all of my variables are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
                                                             
17 Throughout this analysis I examine both fixed effects and random effects models. The results of the Hausman test 
and an additional test of the averages conclude that the RE model is not capturing everything and therefore the FE 
model is the more precise model.  
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First, I will discuss my main variable of interest, PROCAMPO payments. The PROCAMPO 
variable tells an interesting story in that in the FE model the coefficient is negative, and in the RE 
model it is positive. In the FE model a 1% change in PROCAMPO payments leads to an 8.7% 
decrease in land planted in staple crops. This result makes intuitive sense as the FE is only 
accounting for the time effect, and the purpose of PROCAMPO is to provide assistance to switch 
from staple crop production to cash crop production for export. In the RE model, since the 
counties are also being compared to one another, a 1% higher PROCAMPO payment in one county 
means that the county also has 1.7% more land planted in staples. Since PROCAMPO is a program 
that only goes to producers who were planting staples in 1993/1994, it makes sense that those 
municipalities which receive PROCAMPO payments would have a higher percentage of crops in 
staples. Thus, I believe that the RE model is largely picking up the placement of the PROCAMPO 
program.  
The coefficient on the other government payments variable is positive in both models, with 
an effect of a 3.6-3.7% increase in staples for a 1% increase in other government payments. This 
positive effect may be due in part to the fact that price supports for some staple crops were not 
immediately removed in 1994, but were slowly phased out during the 15-year transition period. Two 
important staple crops, corn and beans, were both part of this slow phase out. These additional 
payments to producers of some staple crops may have incented them not to switch to cash crop 
production. These other payments are in some ways counteracting the effect that PROCAMPO is 
having, as they actually compel producers to continue producing certain staple crops.  
My variables that proxy for market demand are population and wages per worker. The 
coefficient on my population variable is positive in both models; however, the magnitude is much 
different between the two models. In the FE model, for a 1% change in population, the area planted 
in staple crops increases by 27%, whereas in the RE model the increase is only 6%. The coefficient 
on wages per worker is negative in both models, and the magnitudes of their effect on staple crop 
production are also very similar. The FE model reports a 3% reduction in staple crop production, 
and the RE model reports a 3.3% decrease given a 1% increase in wages. Thus, in both models it 
appears as if a larger population is associated with a greater demand for staples, while higher income 
indicates a market for cash crops.  
Next I examine my variables that represent transition costs, education levels and 
infrastructure. The FE models show that for a 1% increase in high school education, staple crop 
production decrease by 2.1%. Since education is often needed for producers to fill out credit forms 
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and apply for government payments, I would expect that an increase in education would lead to a 
decrease in staple crop production. My infrastructure variable shows the percent of households 
within a county that have access to a sewage system. The coefficient on this variable is negative in 
both the FE and RE models. These coefficients taken together appear to imply that as education 
and infrastructure increase, staple crop production decreases. Therefore education and infrastructure 
may decrease transaction costs, which allows producers to more easily transition to cash crop 
production. 
I also added in a NAFTA dummy variable and various interaction terms. I interacted the 
NAFTA dummy with my population, wages, and distance variable to see if their effect changes after 
NAFTA. Table 6.2 details the effects of these variables before and after NAFTA. If I first examine 
my FE model, I see that the difference between the effect of population before and after NAFTA is 
less than 1%, so population has minimal affect on production decisions. The effect of wages after 
NAFTA becomes smaller, but it is not statistically significant. Distance to the border has a greater 
effect after NAFTA. Prior to NAFTA a 1% increase in distance led to a 1.6% increase in staple crop 
production. After NAFTA a 1% increase in distance leads to a 5.3% increase in staple crop 
production. Distance from the United States border does likely increase transaction and 
transportation costs, which make producers in southern Mexico less likely to switch to cash crop 
production. 
Similar to the results of my FE model, population does not appear to have much of an effect 
after NAFTA in my RE model. Additionally, in the RE model wages appear to have less of an effect 
after NAFTA. Taken together this once again supports the idea that producers are switching to cash 
crops not based on local market demand, but based on the new markets in the United States and 
Canada. The effect of distance is actually negative before NAFTA, I believe this may be in part due 
to the fact that there are areas in the southern-most part of Mexico that have traditionally produced 
items that would be considered cash crops, such as coffee and citrus. They already produced these 
prior to NAFTA due to having the correct climate and land quality. Other than this region, most of 
Mexico was producing staple crops. This explanation may help account for why areas further from 
the border were producing less staple crops prior to NAFTA. After NAFTA the distance coefficient 
does become positive, and for a 1% increase in distance from the US border there is a 5% increase 
in staple crop production. This effect is similar to that reported by the FE model. 
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Robustness Tests 
To determine the robustness of my main results and to examine the distributional effects of 
PROCAMPO, I ran several different versions of my main model. First, I reduced the number of 
counties in my model to only include those that contain either a high percentage of ejidal lands or 
receive a high amount of PROGRESA payments. Second, I generated a model which examines the 
regional effects of PROCAMPO.  Third, I ran my main model with revenue per hectare as my 
dependent variable. Fourth, I ran a regression including data on two other variables, literacy and the 
existence of cities, which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a county has a city with over 
100,000 people. Fifth, I included the social welfare program, PROGRESA/Oportunidades, in the main 
model. Sixth, in order to further support my assumption that counties are fairly homogenous, I ran 
the model on my dataset that doesn’t include counties that have high standard deviations for wages 
and education. Lastly, since my dependent variable is a percentage constrained to be between 0 and 
1, I ran a Tobit model to see if there was anything that my fixed effects model was not capturing. 
Details of these robustness tests follow.  
Ejidal Lands and PROGRESA Areas 
Not only am I concerned with the overall effect of PROCAMPO, I am also interested in its 
distributional effect across producers. Thus, did PROCAMPO benefit all producers or was its effect 
largely felt by larger commercial producers in the north? By examining areas that have a high 
percentage of ejidal lands or a high amount of PROGRESA payments I hope to see if the 
PROCAMPO program has a similar or different effect from the main model.  
First, I calculate the percent of agricultural land within a county that is categorized as ejidal 
land. I then keep only the half of the data that has the percentage of ejidal lands as greater than the 
mean. I then run my main model on this smaller set of counties. Please see Figure 10 for a 
distribution of these select counties in Mexico. The results of my regression are reported in Table 
7.1.  I focus on the variables that see a marked difference from the main model. In general, the 
results of this model do not differ as greatly from the main model as I had originally expected. The 
effect of PROCAMPO payments is larger in this model. In this model, for a 1% increase in 
PROCAMPO payments, there is a 10% reduction in staple crop production, whereas in my main 
model it was only an 8.7% reduction. Interestingly, education appears to have a greater affect in this 
model. 
Next, since PROGRESA is targeted at the poorest communities in Mexico, I form a dataset 
that only includes those counties that have PROGRESA payments per person that are greater than 
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the mean.18 Please see Figure 10 for a distribution of these select counties in Mexico. I then run my 
main model using only these counties. If I look at my education variable in this model, a 1% increase 
in education coincides with a staple crop production decrease of 0.83%. This is a much smaller 
effect than in the main model, in which it leads to a 1.8% reduction in staples. This reflects that 
education levels are lower in counties that have received greater PROGRESA payments, which is 
consistent with the nature of the program. Also the mean of high school education in this sample is 
4.3% whereas the mean in the complete dataset is 6%. The PROCAMPO coefficient is not 
significant in this model.  
If I examine distance from the United States border, I see that before NAFTA if distance 
increases by 1%, it causes a 5.5% reduction in staple crop production. Possible reasons for this were 
discussed previously. After NAFTA an increase in distance leads to an 8% increase in staple crops; 
however, this is not significant. Please refer to Table 7.2 for the before and after NAFTA 
coefficients for my interaction terms. I believe that I see a positive coefficient after NAFTA when I 
just look at areas that receive larger PROGRESA payments, as many of the areas closest to the 
border are no longer included in the model. When comparing relatively poorer counties to other 
poor counties, distance to the United States border becomes less important as a determining factor 
in regards to staple crop production, and local market demand may become more important.  
If I compare the overall effect of PROCAMPO on ejidal lands and the areas with greater 
PROGRESA payments, I see an interesting result. The ejidal model shows a 10% decrease in staple 
crop production with a 1% increase in PROCAMPO payments. The PROGRESA model shows 
only a .03% decrease in staple crop production and is statistically insignificant. This shows that ejidos 
may be responding differently to receiving PROCAMPO payments than those who are just poor, as 
measured by PROGRESA.  
Regions 
Next, I generated a model where I examine the regional effect of PROCAMPO payments. 
First, I create dummy variables for four regions in Mexico: border, north, central (includes Mexico 
City), and south. Then I interact these regional dummies with the PROCAMPO variable. By creating 
these specifications I hope to see if PROCAMPO affects producers differently in each region in 
Mexico. The results of interest from this regression can be seen in Table 8. The border and northern 
regions show similar results for a 1% increase in PROCAMPO; staple crops decrease by 5% and 7% 
                                                             
18 This is based on 2003 payments and population.  
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respectively. However, in the central states there is only a 1.7% decrease in staple crop production. 
Lastly, in the southern region I actually see an 18.6% increase in the land planted in staples for a 1% 
increase in PROCAMPO payments. This shows that producers in various regions are responding 
differently to PROCAMPO payments, and that those further from the border are less likely to use 
an increase in payments to switch out of staple crop production. This result may be in part due to 
the fact that the price premium on corn is higher in the southern region and that transaction costs to 
send cash crops to the border are too high to make transitioning out of staples possible.  
Agricultural Revenue per Hectare 
For comparison purposes I ran a weighted FE model with the dependent variable now being 
total agricultural revenue and all the independent variables remaining the same as my main model. 
Since the price of staples should be lower than the price of cash crops, I would expect higher 
revenue per hectare to be associated with less staple crops. This means that the signs on my 
coefficients should be opposite of what they were in the previous model. Please reference Table 9. 
In this model all variables are statistically insignificant at the 5% level except for population and high 
school education. Therefore analyzing this model does not yield much information. It is worth 
noting that the high school education variable now has a positive coefficient, and for a 1% increase 
in education there is a 168 peso increase in revenue per hectare.  
Literacy and City Dummy 
I have data on two variables that were not included in the main model for various reasons. 
The variables are percent of the population over fifteen years old that are literate and a dummy 
variable that reports whether a county has at least one city with a population of over 100,000. Please 
see Figures 11 and 12 for maps of these variables. Weighted FE models were run with these 
variables included. The results can be seen in Table 10. Adding the literacy variable to the equation 
produces a positive and significant result. This positive sign may be in part due to the definition of 
literacy. Many people may have basic literacy, as shown by the fact that the mean of my literacy 
variable is 0.8134. The high school variable has much more variation, and therefore gives us a better 
proxy for transition costs than literacy.  
The purpose of running the model with a dummy variable for large cities is that I hope to 
see if it can provide a better proxy for local market demand. By generating a dummy variable, I am 
able to create a comparison between those counties that have a large city and those which do not. 
My city variable therefore replaces my population variable in this model. Many of my variables are 
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very similar in sign and magnitude to the main model. The coefficient on the city variable is worth 
noting, as the model shows a 14.3% increase in staple crop production if a county has a city with a 
population over 100,000. This is a similar effect that I see using the population variable. Therefore, I 
decided to just leave the population and wages in the model to show my market demand, and 
remove the cities variable in my final model.  
PROGRESA 
Originally, I planned to include data on PROGRESA payments in my model. My initial 
speculation was that these payments would increase the amount of cash crops by decreasing the 
credit constraints faced by producers. However, this is not the case, as the PROGRESA payments 
per person are positive in most models. Please refer to Table 11. From this I can see that in a FE 
model a 1% percent increase in PROGRESA payment increases the percentage of land in staple 
crops by 52%. The positive effect of PROGRESA may be due to the fact that it is specifically 
targeted at the poorest rural communities in Mexico. Therefore, these funds are going to areas that 
traditionally have a higher proportion of subsistence farmers and are more likely to have a greater 
percentage of land planted in staple crops to start with. Receiving PROGRESA is also contingent on 
children attending school. This may reduce farm labor, which decreases the amount of other crops 
produced. Also, this program started with only a few communities receiving benefits, but since 1997 
it has expanded to cover a much greater portion of the population. Since the amount of payments is 
increasing each year, the FE model may just be capturing the increase in the number of poor people 
participating in the program in each county. Since I am only able to speculate about why the 
PROGRESA variable is having this effect, it was not included in my main model.  
Homogeneity Test 
I ran this model to further support my assumption that agricultural producers within a 
county are relatively homogenous. Based on the results provided by the 1991 micro-sample survey, I 
removed counties from the dataset that had high standard deviations. Specifically, I removed 
counties that were in the 95th percentile for wages and the 99th percentile for education levels, since 
these counties are the least homogenous. I then ran my main model with this reduced dataset.  See 
Table A.4 of the Appendix for the results. As I had anticipated, the results change very little from 
the main model. This model further supports the idea that even those counties that have more 
heterogeneity do not significantly alter the results.  
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Tobit 
The main reason I ran the Tobit model is to ensure that my dependent variable, which is a 
percentage, is not altering the predictive abilities of my model. The Tobit model allows for non-
normal distributions and mass points at 0 and 1. A histogram showing the distribution of my 
dependent variable, the percent of agricultural land planted in staples, can be found in Figure A.4 of 
the Appendix. This shows that there are some mass points at zero and one, but there also is a steady 
distribution of observations between 0 and 1. The results of running my RE Tobit model can also 
be found in the Table A.5 of the Appendix. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients change 
very little from the weighted RE main model. 
Limitations 
There are a few limitations of my study.  First, I do not observe farm-level data. I am able to 
provide evidence that supports the assumption of county homogeneity; however, this still does not 
allow for me to truly observe the decision making in individual agricultural households. In addition, 
based on the results of the Hausman test, I can only control for placement of the programs using 
fixed effects, which limits the cross-sectional variation. Lastly, since my credit data is only available 
at the state level, I can not explicitly consider PROCAMPO’s affect on agricultural households’ 
access to credit.   
4.3. Model 2: Total Credit 
Model Construction 
As has been stated, I am interested in seeing if producers are credit constrained and if 
PROCAMPO payments as well as other government payments provide them with liquidity. The 
data that I have on credit is only provided at the state level. Please refer to Table 12 for summary 
statistics. Please also refer to Figure 13 which shows the distribution of my credit variable by state. A 
few states did not report credit data. Nonetheless, the distribution of credit supports the idea that 
credit tends to go to larger producers, as the states that have larger farms also have greater amounts 
of credit. This effect can be seen by comparing the map of my PROCAMPO payments (Figure 8) to 
this credit map. I ran my model at the state level with similar variables to my main model except that 
total credit received in thousands of pesos is my dependent variable. My credit equation is: 
Credit = f (Government payments, State characteristics) 
1) Government policies = PROCAMPO, PROGRESA, other government payments 
2) State characteristics = wages per worker, high school education, infrastructure index 
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Model Results 
I generate both fixed effects and random effects models using this data. The results can be 
seen in Table 13. Both models are weighted by total agricultural land in a state and will only compare 
two years, 2001 and 2003, as I do not have credit data for years prior to NAFTA. In my FE model 
very little is statistically significant at the 5% level, which is understandable given that I only have 
two years of credit data.  However, the coefficient on my main program of interest, PROCAMPO, is 
significant at the 5% level. For a 1% increase in PROCAMPO payments there is a 23.6% increase in 
credit. This means that over time, PROCAMPO payments do have a positive effect on the credit 
situation for producers within states. The effect of both PROGRESA and other government 
payments on credit is negative. Both PROGRESA and other government payments are insignificant 
and show relatively small changes.  
In my weighted RE model the coefficients on all my variables are significant at the 5% level. 
Once again, I will first look at the effect of my PROCAMPO variable on credit. For a 1% increase 
in PROCAMPO payments there is a 0.53% increase in credit. Now that I am not just looking at the 
time effect, but also comparing states, the effect of PROCAMPO is much smaller. It does have a 
positive effect on credit, which means both my models support the idea that PROCAMPO may help 
alleviate credit constraint. Once again, I see negative coefficients for my PROGRESA and other 
government payments variables. For a 1% increase in PROGRESA there is a 0.88% decrease in 
credit. Additionally, for a 1% increase in other government payments there is a 0.16% decrease in 
credit. This effect of the government payments may be so small because many of the programs in 
this variable may be going directly to creating infrastructure, irrigation, roads, and technology, and 
not actually be funds that go to producers. Therefore these payments are not necessarily direct cash 
payments.  
Wages per worker and percent of the population with a high school education are both 
positive, as I would expect. An increase in both wages and education should positively affect credit. 
For a 1% increase in wages I see a 0.61% increase in credit, and for a 1% increase in education I see 
an 11% increase in credit. This is finding is encouraging to see as traditionally both wages and 
education are important factors in credit applications. For example, banks may be more willing to 
loan to someone with a high school education than someone with only primary school education. 
Those with a greater level of education also tend to be better equipped to seek credit. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, there has been, and may continue to be, pressure under the WTO agenda for 
countries to move to agricultural support systems that include decoupled income payments. 
Decoupled income payments allow countries to support their agricultural producers without 
distorting crop production and prices. Further studies are needed to truly ascertain the effects that a 
decoupled income payment system has on crop choice in developing countries. Additionally, since 
PROCAMPO is scheduled to be eliminated in 2010, it is important to understand both the strengths 
and weaknesses of this program in order to create an appropriate agricultural program for the future.  
There was much concern and speculation prior to the implementation of NAFTA that 
opening trade would cause poor farmers in Mexico to be made worse off. The Mexican government 
attempted to address this problem by implementing the PROCAMPO program. By examining 
Mexico’s transition from a government controlled price-support agricultural system to decoupled 
income payments, I am able to see that the policy allows even the poorer producers in Mexico to 
benefit from NAFTA.  By examining my map of the distribution of PROCAMPO payments (Figure 
8), I see that PROCAMPO payments are distributed throughout the country. Larger producers tend 
to be located in the northern regions of Mexico, but I can see that even producers in the southern 
regions are receiving payments. This supports the idea that subsistence producers may actually be 
better off under the PROCAMPO system than they were under CONASUPO, primarily because a 
greater number of smaller producers receive financial benefits.  
Additionally, by examining the map of my dependent variable, percent of agricultural land 
planted in staples (Figure 1), I can visually see the distribution of crop change in Mexico from 1991 
to 2003. This map provides a view of the regional distribution of this change, and shows that the 
greatest transition out of staple crop production has been in the northern and central states. Thus, I 
observe some evidence that those areas closer to the border have certain characteristics that allow 
for them to more easily switch to cash crop production. Based on the results of my study this 
transition may be driven in part by transaction costs being greater for counties further from the 
United States border.  
My review of agricultural policies in Mexico during the past twenty years provides evidence 
that many agricultural producers are credit constrained. This finding is based on my discussion of 
the movement away from state-provided credit through Banrural, to the privatization of banking. 
The government even addressed this constraint by changing the payment cycle of PROCAMPO so 
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producers with small agricultural holdings receive payment prior to planting. This change reduces 
producers’ credit constraint and allows them to make investments and crop choice changes prior to 
planting. The agricultural household model that I generate allows for government payments to 
reduce credit constraints so that producers are able to make the capital investments necessary for 
transitioning to cash crop production. 
My data and econometric models provide some evidence that PROCAMPO assisted 
producers in moving away from the production of staple crops and towards the production of 
higher-value, cash crops.  Specifically, I observe a correlation between increased PROCAMPO 
payments and a decrease in the area planted in staples when controlling for county-level fixed 
effects. In my main model, a 1% increase in PROCAMPO payments leads to an 8.7% decrease in 
staple crop production. When I examine my model that only contains the counties with a high 
percent of ejidal lands, the negative effect of PROCAMPO on staple crop production is even 
stronger (10% reduction in staple crop production). This result provides an indication that these 
decoupled income payments have assisted those who are credit constrained to make crop choice 
changes. However, there is also some evidence that other government payments to agriculture have 
slowed this conversion to cash crops. This effect may be due to the lingering price supports and 
quotas which provided incentives for producers to continue planting certain staple crops throughout 
the NAFTA conversion period. There is also some evidence that PROCAMPO payments have 
affected the crop choice changes that are made by producers differently for those in northern and 
border regions versus those in the south.  
I hypothesized that the implementation of NAFTA would be associated with greater cash 
crop production. I can see that the creation of new markets through NAFTA is, in general, leading 
to a reduction in land planted in staples. I also see evidence that producers in both ejidal lands and 
poor regions are responding to new market incentives. Additionally, I hypothesized that areas closest 
to the United States border would see a greater movement to cash crop production after NAFTA 
than those further away from the border.  I find evidence in my model that supports this hypothesis. 
Counties that have decreased staple crop production tend to be closer to the border. This may be 
related to transaction costs, measured in distance to the United States border, being higher for those 
in southern Mexico.  
Since decoupled income payments are a part of the WTO agenda, these results may have 
broader world-wide application. The effects of decoupled income payments on crop choice in 
developed regions, such as the United States and the European Union, may differ due to the 
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presence of fewer credit-constrained producers. Therefore, these payments may have a greater effect 
on crop choice in developing countries which have a significant number of small, subsistence 
producers who might not be able to change production without financial assistance. Given that the 
rural poor tend not to benefit under a system of price supports, a decoupled income payment system 
such as PROCAMPO can assist the poorest producers in a country. Sadoulet (2001) and Cord 
(2001) both found that PROCAMPO payments do have a positive effect on increasing income, 
thereby reducing poverty. In addition, I find evidence that decoupled income payments can reduce 
agricultural producers’ credit constraints. Decoupled income payments may allow for producers to 
make the investments necessary to produce higher-value cash crops, which leads to an increase in 
income and a reduction in rural poverty.  
The results of this study may also provide information that would assist other less-developed 
countries in establishing similar programs. For example, government payments, such as price 
supports, are actually compelling producers to stay in staple crop production. Therefore if a 
government is going to implement a decoupled income program, they should consider minimizing 
the length of time that both the new program and the old price support system co-exist. 
Additionally, the Mexican government did not create the “anticipated” PROCAMPO program until 
2001. If they had instituted this in the mid-1990s when the program was created, the credit 
constrained farmers may have been able to see the benefit from crop choice changes earlier.  
The regional patterns of changing crop choice leads me to state than an investment in 
infrastructure, such as roads, may reduce transaction costs and allow producers further from the 
border to also benefit from expanded markets created by trade agreements. Additionally, there is 
evidence of the importance of investing in human capital, through education. PROGRESA has only 
been in effect for just over ten years; therefore the true effects it has on education of adults cannot 
be evaluated. However, I do find some evidence that additional education can assist producers in 
making crop choice changes. In general, moving to decoupled income payments should allow for 
even the smaller producers in developing countries to benefit from international trade.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Agricultural and Agricultural Trade Related Policies and Institutions (1965-2010) 
 
Policy Year Description
Established CONASUPO                                         
(the National Company of Popular Subsistence)                                                           
1965
Governmental agency that set agricultural policies. Involved in 
creating price supports, buying and distributing commodities, and 
providing credit.
Established Banrural 1975
State owned bank that provided credit to small scale agricultural 
producers.
Joined the GATT                                               
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
1985
Removed some trade barriers, increased exports and saw an 
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI).
Established ASERCA                                              
(Support and Services for Agricultural Marketing)
1991
Goal was to strengthen agricultural trade by building markets 
between producers and buyers, and distributing marketing 
information to producers in order to increase exports. 
Enacted Article 27                                                     
(Ejido  Land Reform)
1992 Granted the right for ejidal  lands to be titled, bought, and sold.
Joined NAFTA                                                 
(North American Free Trade Agreement)
1994
Preferential trade agreement with the United States and Canada. 
Established rules in regards to market access, subsidies, tariffs, and 
phytosanitary standards.         
Established PROCAMPO                               
(Program of Direct Support for the Countryside) 
1994
Provides per hectare decoupled income payments to agricultural 
producers who produced any of nine crops during the 1993/1994 
agricultural season. 
Established Alianza para el Campo                         
(Alliance of the Countryside)
1996
Provide technical assistance for four main program areas: 
agricultural improvement, livestock improvement, rural 
development, and sanitation. 
Dismantled CONASUPO 1999
Process started in 1991 with the guaranteed prices for many crops 
being eliminated. Completed in 1999 when support prices for 
beans and corn were eliminated. 
Established PROGRESA                               
(Program for Education, Health, and Nutrition)
1997
Provides conditional cash payment transfers to poor rural female 
household heads for nutrition, health services, and education. The 
name of the program was later changed to Oportunidades .
Dissolved Banrural , Established Financeria Rural 2003
Privatization of state owned banks started in the early 1990s, 
Banrural  was finally dissolved in 2003. Financeria Rural  was 
established to make loans to agricultural producers.
Completed implementation phase of NAFTA 2008
Final tariff and quota barriers on culturally sensitive crops such as 
corn and beans were lifted. 
Extended PROCAMPO program until 2012 2008
President Calderon announced that he would extend the 
PROCAMPO program until 2012.
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Type Description Units
% of crop land planted in staples dependent
area planted in staple crops divided by 
area planted of all crops (hectares)
%
revenue per hectare for all crops dependent
value of all crops (1,000s of pesos) 
divided by total crop area planted 
(hectares) 1,000s of pesos
population in thousands independent
population of each county (thousands)
1,000s
wages per worker independent
wages per county (1,000s of pesos) 
divided by the number of workers in 
the county 1,000s of pesos
% of population with a high school education independent
number of people in the county that 
have a high school education divided 
by the total population of each county %
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) independent
index that contains percent of the 
population in each county that has 
drainage and sanitation %
PROCAMPO payment per producer independent
total PROCAMPO payments (1,000s 
of pesos) divided by the number of 
producers that received payments 1,000s of pesos
other government payments per farm independent
total other government payments 
(1,000s of pesos) divided by the total 
number of farms in 1991 1,000s of pesos
distance to the US border (1,000s km) independent
distance to the US border from the 
municipal seat reported in thousands of 
kilometers 1,000s of kilometers
NAFTA dummy (before 1994=0, after 1994=1) independent
dummy variable for NAFTA, where 
(before 1994=0, after 1994=1)
0 or 1
% of population over 15 years old that is literate independent
number of people in the county over 15 
years old that are literate divided by the 
population over 15 years %
city dummy (=1 if county has a city over 100,000) independent
dummy variable for cities, where (=1 if 
county has a city over 100,000)
0 or 1
PROGRESA payment per person independent
total PROGRESA payments (1,000s of 
pesos) divide by the municipal 
population 1,000s of pesos
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
% of crop land planted in staples 4293 0.618 0.376 0 1
revenue per hectare for all crops 4293 7.636 10.222 0 172.774
log(population in thousands) 4284 2.876 1.331 0 8.741
log(wages per worker) 4154 2.223 1.068 0 7.363
% of population with a high school education 4267 0.061 0.054 0 0.275
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) 4268 0.000 0.847 -2.346 1.291
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) 4252 1.048 0.895 0 4.064
log(other government payments per farm) 4209 0.400 0.717 0 4.831
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 4155 -0.111 0.854 -6.908 0.870
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994) 4293 0.667 0.471 0 1
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 4284 1.937 1.759 0 8.731
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) 4154 1.510 1.339 0 7.363
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 4155 -0.074 0.700 -6.908 0.870
% of population over 15 years old that is literate 4226 0.813 0.115 0.139 0.979
city dummy (=1 if county has a city over 100,000) 4293 0.047 0.211 0 1
log(PROGRESA payment per person) 4201 0.215 0.216 0 1.626
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Table 5: Initial Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares
Fixed 
Effects
Weighted    
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects
Weighted 
Random 
Effects 
log(population in thousands) 0.0729*** 0.339*** 0.469*** 0.0650*** 0.0772***
(0.0055) (0.0477) (0.116) (0.00718) (0.00004)
log(wages per worker) -0.0314*** -0.0017 -0.0504** -0.0205*** -0.0480***
(0.00675) (0.0101) (0.0246) (0.00745) (0.00006)
% of population with a high school education -1.801*** -1.650*** -2.162*** -1.628*** -1.764***
(0.153) (0.128) (0.349) (0.122) (0.0008)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.0249** 0.0181 0.0739** -0.0068 -0.0023***
(0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0302) (0.0101) (0.00008)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) 0.0235*** -0.0657*** -0.0333*** -0.0238*** 0.0128***
(0.0077) (0.00708) (0.0107) (0.00651) (0.00004)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0028 0.0163** 0.0415*** 0.0119 0.0433***
(0.00844) (0.00793) (0.0119) (0.00779) (0.00004)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0255*** 0.0701*** 0.0704*** 0.0221** 0.0181***
(0.00679) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00884) (0.00004)
constant 0.568*** -0.21 -1.087** 0.600*** 0.543***
(0.0192) (0.14) (0.512) (0.0238) (0.0002)
Observations 4105 4105 4098 4105 4098
Counties 1385 1378 1385 1378
R-squared 0.086 0.149 0.132
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6.1: Main Model 
 
 
 
  
Weighted Fixed 
Effects 
Weighted Random 
Effects
log(population in thousands) 0.265** 0.0589***
(0.131) (0.000045)
log(wages per worker) -0.03 -0.0326***
(0.024) (0.00007)
% of population with a high school education -2.049*** -1.764***
(0.318) (0.000829)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.0466 -0.0450***
(0.0311) (0.000086)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) -0.0869*** 0.0171***
(0.0303) (0.000073)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0374*** 0.0355***
(0.0112) (0.000039)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0163*** -0.0466***
(0.000331) (0.000046)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) 0.145* -0.0390***
(0.0879) (0.000241)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 0.0067 0.0227***
(0.0159) (0.000044)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) 0.0344 0.0115***
(0.0302) (0.000082)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0692*** 0.0965***
(0.0199) (0.000048)
constant -0.337 0.523***
(0.558) (0.000221)
Observations 4098 4098
Counties 1378 1378
R-squared 0.197
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
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Table 6.2: Main Model (Effects Before and After NAFTA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Before 
NAFTA
After 
NAFTA
Before 
NAFTA
After 
NAFTA
log(population in thousands) 0.265** 0.2719** 0.0589*** 0.0816***
(0.131) (0.1223) (0.000045) (0.000037)
log(wages per worker) -0.03 0.0045 -0.0326*** -0.0211***
(0.024) (0.030064) (0.000070) (0.000071)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0163*** 0.0529*** -0.0466*** 0.0499***
(0.00033) (0.019877) (0.000046) (0.000044)
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Weighted Fixed Effects Weighted Random Effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.1: Robustness Model (Ejidal Lands and PROGRESA Areas) 
 
 
  
Ejidal  Lands  PROGRESA Areas
log(population in thousands) 0.23 -0.0953
(0.144) (0.187)
log(wages per worker) -0.0167 0.0317
(0.0287) (0.0308)
% of population with a high school education -2.301*** -0.843*
(0.34) (0.498)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.056 -0.0906**
(0.0366) (0.044)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) -0.0996*** -0.0003
(0.0333) (0.0546)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0575*** 0.0089
(0.0185) (0.0144)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) -0.0345*** -0.0552***
(0.0007) (0.0006)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) 0.127 0.0025
(0.0983) (0.102)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 0.0318* 0.0579**
(0.0164) (0.0241)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) -0.0141 0.0001
(0.0297) (0.026)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0656 0.136**
(0.0485) (0.0569)
constant -0.192 0.785
(0.666) (0.705)
Observations 2049 2062
Counties 685 690
R-squared 0.27 0.169
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted Fixed Effects 
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Table 7.2: Ejidal Lands and PROGRESA Areas (Effects Before and After NAFTA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Before 
NAFTA
After 
NAFTA
Before 
NAFTA
After 
NAFTA
log(population in thousands) 0.23 0.2618* -0.0953 -0.0374
(0.144) (0.1402) (0.187) (0.1823)
log(wages per worker) -0.0167 -0.0309 0.0317 0.0318
(0.0287) (0.0374) (0.0308) (0.0312)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) -0.0345*** 0.0311 -0.0552*** 0.081
(0.0007) (0.0485) (0.0006) (0.0569)
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Ejidal  Lands PROGRESA Areas
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Robustness Model (Regions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Weighted Fixed 
Effects 
log(PROCAMPO payment total)×Border Region -0.0525*
(0.0316)
log(PROCAMPO payment total)×North Region -0.0723***
(0.0238)
log(PROCAMPO payment total)×Center Region -0.0169
(0.0295)
log(PROCAMPO payment total)×South Region 0.186***
(0.0481)
Observations 4098
States 1378
R-squared 0.272
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Robustness Model (Agricultural Revenue per Hectare) 
 
  
Weighted Fixed 
Effects 
log(population in thousands) 5.392**
(2.674)
log(wages per worker) -0.385
(0.326)
% of population with a high school education 16.83**
(7.475)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.278
(0.713)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) -0.638
(0.625)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0154
(0.314)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.397
(14.05)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) 1.272
(1.74)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) -1.104***
(0.283)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) 1.006**
(0.459)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.282
(0.517)
constant -14.37
(11.83)
Observations 4098
Counties 1378
R-squared 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Agricultural Revenue per Hectare
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Table 10: Robustness Model (Literacy and City Dummy) 
 
 
  
Literacy City Dummy
log(population in thousands) 0.183
(0.137)
log(wages per worker) -0.0377 -0.0341
(0.0244) (0.0237)
% of population with a high school education -2.040*** -1.972***
(0.32) (0.329)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.0873*** -0.0664**
(0.0335) (0.0313)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) -0.0665** -0.101***
(0.0315) (0.0297)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0387*** 0.0404***
(0.0113) (0.0118)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0438*** -0.0137***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) 0.051 0.181**
(0.0993) (0.0917)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 0.0031
(0.0159)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) 0.0497 0.0557**
(0.0311) (0.0245)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0675*** 0.0669***
(0.0197) (0.0199)
% of population over 15 years old that is literate 1.598***
(0.535)
city dummy (=1 if county has a city over 100,000) 0.143***
(0.0011)
constant -1.295** 0.800***
(0.59) (0.0775)
Observations 4098 4098
Counties 1378 1378
R-squared 0.203 0.187
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted Fixed Effects 
53 
 
Table 11: Robustness Model (PROGRESA) 
 
 
  
Weighted Fixed 
Effects 
log(population in thousands) 0.263**
(0.129)
log(wages per worker) -0.0479**
(0.0238)
% of population with a high school education -1.915***
(0.33)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.0791**
(0.0346)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) -0.0529*
(0.0309)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0384***
(0.0113)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0126***
(0.0003)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) -0.167
(0.103)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 0.0074
(0.0151)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) 0.0737**
(0.0308)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0605***
(0.0197)
log(PROGRESA payment per person) 0.518***
(0.111)
constant -0.294
(0.552)
Observations 4098
Counties 1378
R-squared 0.219
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
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Table 12: State-Level Summary Statistics 
 
 
Table 13: Credit Model 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log(credit payment in 1,000s of pesos) 64 10.928 5.145 0 19.849
log(PROCAMPO payment in 1,000s of pesos) 64 12.463 1.274 8.477 14.275
log(PROGRESA payment in 1,000s of pesos) 64 12.370 2.533 0 14.712
log(other government payment in 1,000s of pesos) 64 8.723 5.451 0 14.604
log(wages per worker in 1,000s of pesos) 64 5.955 1.047 4.403 8.000
% of population with a high school education 64 0.143 0.050 0.058 0.261
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) 64 0.411 0.604 -1.428 1.319
year dummy (=0 if year is 2001, =1 if year is 2003) 64 0.500 0.504 0 1
Weighted   
Fixed Effects 
Weighted 
Random Effects 
log(PROCAMPO payment total) 23.61** 0.531***
(10.42) (0.00097)
log(PROGRESA payment total) -2.959 -0.883***
(7.167) (0.00106)
log(other government payments total) -0.265 -0.163***
(0.204) (0.00013)
log(wages per worker) -0.0246 0.607***
(3.818) (0.00081)
% of population with a high school education -106.9 11.02***
(76.01) (0.0386)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -16.63** -3.966***
(6.358) (0.00223)
year dummy (0=2001 and 1=2003) 25.17** 3.559***
(9.223) (0.00306)
constant -251.2 11.47***
(156) (0.017)
Observations 64 64
States 32 32
R-squared 0.505
log(Credit Payment)
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Average Crop Prices 
 
Table A.2: Price Premium 
 
Table A.3: Tests for County Homogeneity 
 
  
1991 2001 2003
Corn Price 6.09 1.74 1.32
Staple Price 6.64 2.20 1.63
Other Price 4.50 0.85 1.66
All prices are in pesos and are deflated using the 2003 CPI
Tomato
1991 2003 2003
Border 0.97 0.63 0.91
North 0.95 0.89 0.79
Central 0.99 1.11 0.86
Capital 1.02 0.90 2.15
South 1.08 1.29 1.27
All prices are in pesos and are deflated using the 2003 CPI
Price Premium
CornRegion
Avg. St. Dev Std. Dev. Of Avg.
Wage 1,095,499              2,124,893              
Education 0.6909 0.7444
Micro-Sample of the 1991 Population Census, INEGI
Counties with Agricultural Land Owners
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Table A.4: Robustness Model (Homogeneity Test) 
 
 
  
Weighted Fixed 
Effects 
log(population in thousands) 0.264**
(0.132)
log(wages per worker) -0.0306
(0.0242)
% of population with a high school education -1.985***
(0.318)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.0514
(0.0313)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) -0.0898***
(0.0304)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0386***
(0.0115)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0173***
(0.0003)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) 0.154*
(0.0877)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 0.0056
(0.0159)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) 0.035
(0.0303)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.0687***
(0.0201)
constant -0.337
(0.564)
Observations 4038
Counties 1358
R-squared 0.192
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
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Table A.5: Robustness Model (Tobit) 
 
 
 
  
Tobit Weighted 
Random Effects 
log(population in thousands) 0.0621***
(0.000050)
log(wages per worker) -0.0309***
(0.000078)
% of population with a high school education -2.037***
(0.00093)
infrastructure index (drainage and sanitation) -0.0476***
(0.000096)
log(PROCAMPO payment per producer) 0.0288***
(0.000082)
log(other government payments per farm) 0.0295***
(0.000044)
log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) -0.0487***
(0.000051)
NAFTA dummy (=1 if year is after 1994 ) -0.0421***
(0.00027)
NAFTA×log(population in thousands) 0.0344***
(0.00005)
NAFTA×log(wages per worker) -0.0013***
(0.000092)
NAFTA×log(distance to the US border in 1,000s km) 0.107***
(0.000055)
constant 0.514***
(0.000245)
Observations 4098
Counties 1378
Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A.1: Histogram of the Standard Deviation of Wages 
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Figure A.2: Histogram of the Standard Deviation of Education 
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Figure A.4: Histogram of the Percent of Agricultural Land in Staples 
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